While few of us will ever know the complete truth (at least this side of the eschaton), it looks as though the Coalition finally made good on its threats to take matters into its own hands in the tribal areas of Pakistan. According to local reports, three helicopters deployed a team of Coalition and Afghan forces into a remote tribal village, killing up to twenty people, to include women and children. There has also been a spike in alleged “Predator missile strikes”.
I have never been silent about my hesitation to support such a policy. As stated in previous blogs, I think that Pakistan is already as dangerous as Afghanistan, and far more difficult to pacify. If these alleged violations of Pakistan sovereignty are the “first shoe”, the second shoe I expect to hear next are reports of even more widespread suicide bombings, the growth of parastate “Sharia” judicial and policing institutions of the “Taliban” variety, and a polarization of the society, army, intelligence forces, and government.
The newly (indirectly) elected president, Zardari, hardly looks to be capable of navigating these waters. Even given the best star chart, the ship he steers is barely seaworthy, and (thanks to the army, ISI, and a thoroughly corrupt and incapable bureaucracy) his steering wheel has about 30 degrees of play in each direction (if it is connected to the rudder at all).
I hope that I am very wrong. Our government is a big player in how this works out, and sometimes big risks pay of even bigger. I trust our government’s intentions, but for outcomes, I tend to look at history rather than hope. And history suggests that this won’t be pretty (but then again, history also suggests that we’ll eventually detach ourselves and won’t really notice… until the next time we get involved).
Until then, I will continue to look for indicators of all hypothesis; to include those that will confirm my “pet” hypothesis of doom and gloom, the “null” hypothesis of the status quo, the “rosy” hypothesis that this will help, and everything in between.
My best bet is that this was a test, a sort of “trial balloon” designed to test the insurgency, the Pakistan leaders and people, and the general efficacy of cross-border direct actions. If I am right, policy makers are now watching for their reactions, all the while developing the most effective action to take the next time a vetted target pops up on the Pakistan section of the radical Islamist radar.
