The weeks since my last post have been a busy time for those who follow Pakistani politics. As I wrote last time, I was waiting for the “other shoe to drop” as various groups in Pakistan reacted to our increased cross-border attacks. The shoe has dropped, but the result has been much more muted than I feared. This muted response has been just one part of a series of indicators that describe the democratic regime’s “new” strategy against militant Islam within its borders.
The Reaction.
While this has not been pretty, with Pakistani troops and tribals firing at U.S. helicopters and drones; generals suggesting that violations of sovereignty being met in kind; and the Prime Minister labeling our actions “terrorism”; it could have gone much worse (and may still do so). They remain our ally in the war and seem to be willing to work around our differences on this matter. It may still undermine our operational and tactical cooperation (I imagine that the Tripartite meetings are pretty tense, if they occur at all), but the ruling politicians did not pander to anti-Americanism to bolster their popular support. At least not yet. This shows that their heads are still in the game, and that they are willing to take some hits to stay there (as has the tremendous loss of life and property they have sustained).
Hiring Actions.
The government allowed General Kayani, the former head of the ISI and someone we work reasonably well with, to replace the head of ISI with General Pasha, someone whom we also work well with and who was in charge of operations in the FATA. This seems to be an indicator of at least two things: the Army is being allowed significant latitude and that waging COIN in the FATA more effectively will be a top priority for the Army.
Stated Game Plan.
On Wednesday, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Qureshi, presented his government’s new plan for fighting terrorism in Pakistan. The most significant details were: the desire to fight intransigent militants with “calibrated force”; a plan to negotiate with “moderate” militants who are willing to lay down their arms; a nationwide media campaign to garner support for winning the war against tribal extremists; and developing the tribal belt socially and economically. Two of the strategies, the media and development campaigns, are completely welcome (although who really believes they can/will be done well?); and “calibrated force” could mean just about anything; but the strategy of negotiating with moderate militants will upset those who believe this will allow the Taliban to further consolidate their control. On the other hand, it could allow a clear path (especially if combined with political reform in the tribal areas) for “moderate militants” to pursue their objectives using more legitimate (and less risky) means.
What It All May Mean
Overall, none of this is all that different from the playbook of the Musharraf administration. He balanced outrage over U.S. pressure with cooperation; replaced top Army and ISI generals with his supporters and discriminated against extremists; and had a well-balanced game plan that included all the right talking points. The best way forward for Pakistan is not in making big changes in strategy, but rather in generating the political will/support to continue the effort and making incremental improvements in the efficiency of the various COIN efforts/dimensions. The presentation by FM Qureshi, combined with recent personnel changes, the sustained military/political effort in Bajaur, and the willingness not to make too much hay out of coalition efforts along the border, provide some basis for hope that such incremental changes will continue under the new democratic regime.
